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## WAYS OF DENOTING THE ENEMY IN MEDIA TEXTS. UKRAINIAN AND POLISH DOCUMENTARY FILMS, UKRAINIAN FEATURE FILMS AND MASS MEDIA

The article presents the analysis of language units to denote an enemy used in media content of different genres: official media reports, documentaries and feature films. The relevance of the study is determined by the urgent need to study the peculiarities of linguistic film discourses in the media in general and cinema as a special type of media content. The subject of the research is the linguistic forms of naming the enemy in Ukrainian documentary and feature films during the period of the full-scale invasion and the use of similar forms in media texts to determine the peculiarities of the correlation between different media genres. The researcher set the goal of describing the linguistic forms used to name the enemy and to trace their correlation in various media genres. The following methods were used to achieve this goal: content analysis, comparative analysis, semantic analysis, context analysis.

The results of the study prove that the words with the attribute of hate speech that contain an intention of humiliation, disrespect, etc., are a special linguistic strategy which becomes leading for media during the period of the armed confrontation. Similarity in narratives and nominations proves the formation of a common speech discourse for the media content different in nature. Among the most widely-spread denominations one can determine: “rusnia”, “katsap / katsapnia”, “ruscists”, “moskals”, “orks”, “nechyst”, the use of such notions as “Russian world”, “liberators” marked by propaganda and used ironically and derogatorily also draw attention.

Such denominations are a manifestation of the language of enmity, which is usually perceived as an undesirable manifestation of mental intolerance, however, in times of war, the formation of a whole layer of such denominations appears as a manifestation of resistance, ideological opposition to the enemy, a psychological mechanism of its dehumanization against the background of a heightened perception of one's identity in the face of a threat.

*Keywords:* hate speech; media content; documentary; feature film.

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Both a feature film and a documentary are a special product uniting the representation of the author's worldview idea, the author's approach and an important media intention because the reality, current for its creators, becomes a background for a story or stories of characters. On the other hand, being a media product, the film represents the social reality of the time when it was created, including lingual reality. In fact, a film, like any message, uses language tools and participates in creating the phenomenon which Professor Bogusław Skowronek (Skowronek, 2022) called a lingual image of the world. This notion is topical for our research as the war worldview mirrors profound worldview peculiarities of the people who live through this traumatic experience. Moreover, these notions were also explored by such researchers as Janusz Anusiewicz, Anna Dąbrowska, Michael Fleischer (Anusiewicz, 2000). They spoke about the contexts of culture and lingual images in general. Waldemar Czachur

researches the lingual worldview in the context of media (2011). The author makes a strong emphasis on this, talking about language discourse as a plane between speaking and thinking. For our research the author's comment that “discourses are language and social phenomena arising in particular communities” (2011, p. 81) is valuable. Also, the lingual world image in media and culture in general is researched by Damian Zakrzewski (2015); Bartłomiej Łódzki (2017) and others.

The relevance of the presented research lies in determining how the linguistic portrayal of the wartime world is reflected in various media genres, including news reports and fiction films or documentaries. Comparison of relevance of enemy denoting lexemes functioning in these media texts can demonstrate how strongly certain definitions come into the lingual worldview through a media product and how media currently reflect fast language units' functioning in the society. This is also connected with the

high emotional intensity of film, which is written about in detail by Janusz Plisiecki (2010). Moreover, it concerns, to some extent, both fiction films and documentaries, although the emotional intensity of the fiction films is read by the viewers faster because it meets their expectations, instead, emotional intensity of the documentary films is not so obvious but it is created by editing, music, selection of comments, etc., as well. In war films, news reports of wartime when the events relate to immediate feelings of the viewer and the authors, the emotional intensity is extremely high and this, in our point of view, accelerates mutual penetration of connotative messages from everyday speech and media products and vice versa.

When we speak about war films, it will be appropriate to analyse them within the notion of a “conflict text” because the oppositionality of thinking is the main attribute of such a product. In the situation of armed confrontation, the border between us and them, the enemy, is made utterly clear, emotionally vivid, which is notable from the analysis of individual lexemes where the expression of hatred is very intense, a desire to degrade the enemy, to devalue them is noted, and this becomes a clear linguistic strategy. Analysing the appearance and development of this strategy in the 2000s as a method of public opinion production, Joanna Hučková appeals to theoretic positions by Walter Lippman:

Walter Lippman specified that during the Great War or World War I the countries did not become mobilized to fight until the enemy was presented as an embodiment of the devil. He wrote about the epoch when newspapers were the main method of public opinion formation. In the 1920s, its function was taken over by cinema, which was noticed and used in its theory and practice by the leader of the British school of documentary John Grierson. (2023, p. 78)

The image of the enemy from the society’s consciousness represents the conception about who is the real danger for the community, the country. If interaction with a current enemy has a long history, it is possible to trace the dynamics in these ways of denomination; some lexemes are able to be transferred from generation to generation through everyday speaking or cultural products, become obsolete and then recover in the language depending on the changed cultural and political background. Any text about an enemy falls into the category of a “conflict text” because it concerns worldview oppositionality, the opposition of two groups — “we-they”, “enemy-friend”. The discussion does not pertain to the peculiarities of a concrete national experience or one language as this perception and representation of the categories analysed is intrinsic to any language of the people experiencing or having experienced aggression.

At some time a French theoretician Andre Bazin, having analysed scenes of battle near Moscow in the

fifth film of the cycle “Why We Fight”, drew attention to the fact that the creation of a stereotypical image of an enemy after World War II is dangerous (Bazin, 1963). In a certain sense, the author’s observations hold weight as he makes them almost twenty years after the end of the war, and the world at this time requires the creation of other narratives. Instead, in the case of an ongoing war, its participants cannot refrain from using hate speech. This is exactly what Walter Lippman pointed out (1922).

However, even in the common historic memory of the people there persist typical designations of the enemy that represent the history the nation’s experience; for example, Piotr Zwierzchowski, a researcher of the Polish cinema of the 60s writes about “typical Polish memory about the war” (2011). The analysed documentaries made by Ukrainian and Polish directors show that a common context is created but in the Polish films the derogatory lexemes are not used so intensely, it looks as if the protagonists restrain themselves before foreign journalists, which is why the extremely emotionally charged lexemes like, for example, “*pigdogs*”, “*rusniavvi*”, “*Mokshans*”, “*swamp-lands*” do not sound extremely emotional, instead, “*they*” is used most often.

Thus, speaking about the word image of this war we, first of all, speak about lexis fixing in this image conformation of friend-enemy, and defining the enemy using the hate speech.

Anna Cegieła gives a fundamental definition of hate speech in her research (2014), also depicting issues in the perception of this notion. Without dwelling on what has already been said, it should be determined that in our context hate speech emerges as a potent verbal weapon in the information confrontation: “Hatred has out-of-language sources but the verbal actions expressing this feeling certify that the object of hatred is not perceived normally and proportionally” (2014, p. 10). It is quite apt when it comes to the image of the enemy created during the acute phase of confrontation.

Why do media create a negative image of the enemy at this stage? As the Ukrainian resistance experience demonstrates and the historic experience of world wars proves, derogation of the enemy and glorification of the nation’s defenders is a natural expression inherent to the dichotomy of consciousness, thinking in opposing concepts, which becomes more clear in the state of crisis. To defend, one should be inspired, and the image of a despicable enemy who is dehumanized, removes inhibitory factors from one’s consciousness that hinder the possibility of stepping over ordinary human feelings towards another person. The more disastrous events are accumulated, the more acute a reaction becomes and the more negative and demonic the image of the enemy becomes. We can observe that in the Ukrainian media environment while comparing language discourses from 2015 to 2022 and from 2022.

The first stage of forming the image of the enemy is the identification of its typological features, namely

negative ones and those that evoke negative feelings — a certain negative stereotyping of the enemy. The second stage is enrichment and fixation of the image, filling in its volume. Thus, the main vectors of using a hate strategy in enemy denomination is derogation, alienation, weakening, disrespect, dehumanization and stigmatization. Magdalena Baran thinks that the hate strategy remains unchanged from the previous century: “The XX century was marked by the use of hate speech as a tool for stoking conflicts and wars. Regardless of the scale, geographical conditions, historical context, or cultural origins, its mechanism is almost always similar” (2015), and this can be considered a valid viewpoint.

The enemy is the one who violates the order, threatens, the one who is dangerous. Anna Cegieła describes this process as follows:

A criterion for considering a linguistic procedure as an element of a hate strategy is such a type of procedure which forms the image of a person (or a group of people) pointing at the socially dangerous characteristics, i.e. presenting them as those destabilizing a social order like a dangerous enemy or a person who does not deserve a fine attitude. (2014, p. 10)

For social reality a possibility to resist is important, that is why media, as the experience of World War I and World War II shows, are intensely involved into the process of formation of relevant discourse, in the current media reality we do not only see how it is implemented in the official media but also in social media through the creation of, for example, meme content, as well as how it is represented in films. “Decades later it is being used the same way, with the same purpose — to point at the enemy, to put a responsibility for any failures on them, to trace them, to scare them and to kill them, at last” (2014, p. 12).

In numerous understandings in the context of the current war, the image of enemy is formed in the area of derogation and ridiculing, when, on the one hand, this is an offence or humiliation (“Hate speech includes a phenomenon of offence of another person or a group of people. An offence or offences are understood as “offensive behavior or expression (verbal or written) which are perceived, felt or designed in such a way to be humiliating or offensive” (Hučkova, 2023)).

The researchers have already drawn attention to this component of enemy humiliation strategy — ridiculing:

It was always represented by Russia-Imperial, Soviet, or Putin’s. Even for those nostalgic for the Soviet or recent past with Russia, Putin’s aggression put everything in its place. That is why, after a full-scale invasion, the constructs “Rusnia”, “f\*ing Rusnia”, and “good Russian — dead Russian” appear, which become elements of the oppositional

mass identity — “us against them” (Osipova, 2023),

and this is clearly seen in the tendencies of artistic cinema, memes and songs. Since this discourse has now engulfed not only the social media but also official media, journalists face the question on whether this corresponds to democracy, tolerance, and the values of modern society, which are combating inter-ethnic hostility and calling for the avoidance of hate speech. Jadwiga Hučkova makes a very good point on this, analyzing how after World War II the direction of hate changes gradually due to the decrease of emotional intensity:

The films in the 1940s openly called for hatred to concrete nations which would be impossible in the current civilized world (could it be that in the era of current conflicts there are no exceptions?). Negative emotions regarding the events that occurred 80 years ago are largely justified by the traumas experienced at that time. In the 1960s these emotions were clearly separated from concrete nations; the place of the national enemy is taken by ideologies: fascism and Nazism. (Hučkova, 2023)

Similarly, amidst the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation emotions are very intense, and correspondingly, the lexemes used to denominate the enemy can be nationally intolerant, rude (for example, “pigdogs”, “pigs”, “devils”).

Derogatory denomination of the enemy refers to the collective memory about World War II as well as historically challenging relations with the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union and Russia. Thus, we can speak about the availability of powerful historical discourse of enemy denomination and how some of said denominations used by current media are used historically (for example, “*moskals*”, “*katsaps*”).

Naming the enemy can be just as important as naming the war itself. In the case with Ukraine, a spontaneously developing symbiosis of Soviet vocabulary and that of global popular culture defined this aspect as well. On one hand, the Ukrainian terms *okupanty* and *zaharbnyky* (both translating as “occupiers”), widely applied to Nazi German forces in Soviet Ukrainian official discourse during and after World War II, came back with a vengeance in mainstream media. State institutions also revived the still-recognizable Soviet slogan “Death to the German occupiers!” by substituting the phrase “Russian occupiers”. (Yekelchik, 2022)

Serhyj Yekelchik states that official media mostly do not use powerful emotionally charged denominations of enemy and this can fully correspond to the media discourse until 2022 when the Russian army was mostly called “*occupiers*”, “*zaharbnyky*” or even

“green men”, however, as our cursory analysis of media materials shows, these words were present infrequently and mainly included in the direct speech of the protagonists. Instead, since 2022, the quantity of these names has grown notably on social networks and even on TV. In the Polish documentary “Rok wojny na Ukrainie” it is said that the expression of a border guard on Zmiinyi island, a reply to the Russian ship “Russian warship, go f\*ck yourself” became an important slogan supporting the entire Ukrainian resistance. It became a slogan of strong will, defiance, disdain towards the enemy. It was called a meme-based heroism of the Ukrainians — a cult expression of this war. Thus, media-and psychological importance of dehumanization and demonization of the enemy image becomes absolutely understandable, and one of the leading phenomena of discourse of resistance in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Olena Skliar offers a certain classification of negative names of the enemy, according to the type of addressee:

Taking the addressee into account one can identify two groups of invectives functioning during wartime: 1) directed against the people or the country-aggressor in general: orcs, Mordor, ruscists, rashka, rusnia, pigdogs, etc; 2) directed against the politicians of the country-aggressor: putler, kh\*\*lo, bunkernyi did (English: bunker old man), Kremlin dwarf, etc. (2022, p. 71)

The material analysed includes the names of the first group only because our task is to research the ways of naming the enemy as a whole rather than an individual political figure.

The article analyses Ukrainian feature films “Pozyvnyi Banderas” (Call Sign “Banderas”) (2018), “Dobrovolets” (“Volunteer Fighter”) (2022), “Shpytal” (“Hospital”) (2023), “Ya — Nadiia” (“I am a Hope”), “Druzi” (“Friends”) (2023), “Volontery” (“Volunteers”) (2023); Ukrainian documentaries “Mariupol. Okupatsiia” (“Mariupol. Occupation”) (2023), “Bucha. Misto Nezlamnykh” (“Bucha. The Town of the Unbreakable”) (2023), “Bytva za Irpin” (“Fight for Irpin”) (2023); Polish documentaries “Awdijiwka — Cztery Pory Roku. Raport z Oblężonego Miasta. Reportaż Mateusz Lachowskiego” (hereinafter referred to as “Awdijiwka”) (2023), “Charków. Zwiadowcy ze 130. Kijowskiego Batalionu Obrony Terytorialnej pod Rosyjskim Ostrzałem” (hereinafter referred to as “Charków”) (2023), “Anioły Bachmutu. Reportaż Mateusza Lachowskiego” (hereinafter referred to as “Anioły Bachmutu”) (2023), “Pół roku wojny na Ukrainie” (2022), “Rok wojny na Ukrainie” (2023), “Dwa Lata Wojny na Ukrainie” (2024); “Mariupol: Agresja Rosii” (2023). Also, there have been analysed publications from the websites of Radio Svoboda and Zn.ua through the search via key words to confirm a hypothesis that feature and documentary films are an integral part of the media discourse and are formed based on the same narratives.

The table below providing empiric material shows the formation of a discourse of resistance to the enemy, common for the entire media environment, the use of the same denominations in the news reports on the portals of official media as well as in documentaries and feature films.

During analysis there were found similar contexts where the designated language units are used to name the enemy, both in documentary and feature films, and in publications of online media.

Table 1. Examples of hate speech use in films and media

Examples of lexemes	Films			Media		Comment
	Ukrainian fiction films	Ukrainian documentaries	Polish documentaries	Radio Svoboda	ZN.UA	
Rusnia	+	+	+	as rusnia states (13.02.24) We are afraid that rusnia will find out (23.11.23) Here was rusnia (15.07.23) The word “rusnia” is very popular in trenches on the front line (20.05.23) rusnia will attack (05.03.23) today rusnia have committed another act of terrorism (15.09.22) rusnia held mortar fire (23.08.22) Who could ordered – Rusnia (20.11.18) They do not say about rebels yet, mostly there are rusnia there (10.02.15)	rusnia always tell lies. Second, military plane is always a legitimate aim. Rusnia forces the issue with prisoners of war. “know-how from rusnia” 24.01.24 (02.09.23) Thus, according to rusnia’s version, everybody must be at home. (26.07.23) and no rusnia i ніякої русні (27.07.23) rusnia is taken farther towards Mariupol (07.05.23) If these rusnia’s words were worthy anything (09.04.23) Rusnia is getting mad (05.03.23) Rusnia will write about “reconstruction and they will start building everything new here”. That’s why they are rusnia, to lie” (29.01.23) we will force damned rusnia out, chasing them to Moscow (14.03.2022) First, she said that was “rusnia” (20.11.18)	rusnia is a negative nomination of Russians where the suffix ‘n’ gives a connotation of disrespect (compare: soldantia, matrosnia)

Examples of lexemes	Films			Media		Comment
	Ukrainian fiction films	Ukrainian documentaries	Polish documentaries	Radio Svoboda	ZN.UA	
Katsaps	+	+	+	connection disappeared, it was turned off by <b>katsaps</b> ..., counterattack not to let <b>katsaps</b> come close (18.08.2023) neither equipment or <b>katsaps</b> are found (20.11.2022) fuel containers of <b>katsaps</b> exploded (26.10.2022) they still remain “easterns — <b>katsaps</b> ” (08.08.2018) <b>Katsap</b> , under the text, “indicates” (26.05.2017) I have never been <b>katsap</b> and will never be... (23.07.2017)	differentiate harmful thoughts about katsaps (31.12.2023) Universal logical reply: “Because they are katsaps” is correct (08.06.2023) pacificating agents of influence, both katsaps’ and western (30.05.2023) How to live in a hotel where there are katsaps (05.03.2023) God forbid to be born as katsap (20.01.2023) centralized power, like at katsaps’ is not needed (06.01.2018)	“the word katsap has a Turkic origin (qassab — slaughterer, butcher, the one who kills cattle) and relates to the bloody events of capturing Kazan by the troops of Moscow Tsar Ivan the Terrible and his backstabbing behavior with the Volga Tatars (Kurianyuk, 2013)
Ruscists	+	+		“Calling the prisoners of war “Nazis” and “fascists”, ruscist was questioning them (13.12.2023) “Genocide and fascism are the things we see and... Entire costume is symbolic — I am a character ruscist (09.05.2023) ruscist organized kidnapping and torture for local civilians (18.01.2023) Colorado, Soviet trash, ruscist and vatnik, I’m the one who loves vodka 08.09.2019) “Ruscist” Volodymyr Putin speaks Russian (23.09.2015)	on the battlefield against ruscists(27.02.2024) ruscists kidnapped Ukrainian patriot (27.02.2024) the least of the ruscists’ sins (25.02.2024) Ruscists intensified shelling (24.02.2024) complaints from one of the ruscists (21.02.2024) to help ruscists (13.02.2024) A video spread by ruscists (08.02.2024)	“a new word ‘ruscism’ was formed from the name of the country — Russia-pronounced in English combined with the word ‘fascism’. The semantics of this word spea for itself – Russia follows a fascist type of behavior and the ideology of chauvinism.
Moskals	+			Moskals used a lot of different mines (29.02.2024) Death to moskals! (27.02.2024) there moskals are being hung on the trees (13.09.2023) moskals-stablemen who served at stud-farms (27.05.2023) rename Russia for Muscovy (23.03.2023)	over which crafty moskals fire on and off playfully towards West (14.07.2014) it has always everything clear with moskals (21.08.2015)	The issue concerning the origin of the noun “moskal” in linguistic science is under discussion. It can be read about in more detail in the work by Dariia Yakymovych-Chapran (Yakymovych —Chapran 2020).
Bydlo		+	+	they started, drunk bydlo, run with guns (28.08.2023) the Ukrainian people is not bydlo (20.02.2023) this is natural bydlo who failed to reach something in life (07.02.2023) bydlo who is not pleasant to meet (28.11.2021)	“Bydlo!” — this word, filled with disguised hatred and contempt, hissed at me directly in the face by a very well-groomed and expensively dressed middle-aged man. (09.11.2020) a Ukrainian farmer is not bydlo (07.12.2018) The rhetoric about “slavery” and “bydlo” from those who have never held a hammer in their hands, and the unwillingness to wake up from the dream of “Nazis” (08.06.2016)	this word is expressively marked as humiliating, it was traditionally used by invaders to name the native people of Ukraine to make an impression about their low level, now it is used to designate the level of civilization of the enemy.
Nechyst	+		+	Kazakhstan is also against this nechyst (07.03.2023) nechyst will try to arrive and we must be ready to kick out this nechyst (06.05.2022) let’s banish nechist (30.04.2022)	communistic, Soviet and Russian-imperial nechyst (10.11.2023) will push this nechyst off our borders (13.06.2023) Moscow devils (08.06.2023)	the word “nechyst” (the evil) comes from the spiritual-and-religious idea of the world. This is a name for those who violate the laws of spiritual life, belief.
Orcs	+	+	+	Who are orcs?: a resident from Enerhodar told about the interrogations in FSS and deportation (13.02.2024) orcs overcame the demarcation line (26.11.2023) Well, here come those orcs now... (02.09.2023) these orcs even do not bother to... (24.08.2023) two weeks the orcs change (17.08.2023) orcs persuade people with their shellings (03.08.2023) there were already orcs there (17.07.2023) where orcs came in (20.04.2023)	under the boot of the Russian orc (24.02.2024) Orcs are trying to get in and cut the lines of supply although there are other options there (13.02.2024) If one defender of ours lied down for each orc killed this arithmetic would be so scary orcs were systematically attacking the power grid (14.12.2023) shellings of the oblast by orcs (07.12.2023) they remained the same wild orcs as they had been before (31.10.2023) Orcs were driving by one side (17.10.2023)	In the modern discourse the names of mythological creatures – scary but intellectually lower are used to name Russians. Olexii Yas (Yas 2023) writes about this in his research

Examples of lexemes	Films			Media		Comment
	Ukrainian fiction films	Ukrainian documentaries	Polish documentaries	Radio Svoboda	ZN.UA	
"Russian world"	+	+	+	those who helped to establish "the Russian world" (02.03.2024) betrayed Ukrainians and thanked for the "Russian world" (10.11.2023) consequences of the "Russian world" (16.06.2023) dwellings not touched by the "Russian world" (04.05.2023) propagation of the "Russian world" ideas (02.05.2023) real face of the "Russian world" (19.03.2023)	–	Propagandists started to use this word; in Ukrainian discourse it acquires another meaning altogether — anticivilization.

Not so frequently but in films the following denominations were used: "northern neighbor" (Volunteer Fighter), "vata" (English: cotton), "zomboiashchik" (English: zombie-box) (Call Sign Banders), "nedoluhe hanchiria" (English: simple-minded fools) (Mariupol: Agresja Rosii)

The domination "they" is also very widespread; it is a part of the discursive opposition "we-they", which reflects the detachment of the enemy from ourselves, the perception of them as others, of other culture, of other civilization (for example, in Zn.ua: "They will kill us all" (17.02.2017)).

### Conclusions

Thus, the research proves that disrespecting forms of enemy naming are spread and fixed in the spoken discourse in the acute phase of the war, and that hate speech becomes a strategy of ideological confrontation, encouraging the spreading of the narratives of hatred, disrespect and humiliation towards the enemy.

Some lexemes are historically enrooted (*moskal*, *katsap*), which at a particular stage became obsolete but in the period analysed they start to be used intensely, the other ones are new and borrowed from the current content or are entirely new formations (orcs, pigdogs).

Hate speech, which is unwilling for media texts in times of peace, develops unhindered in wartime because it is a psychological need of the speaker, a strategy of resistance, which has been repeatedly pointed out by researchers.

The research proves that the crisis period encourages the rapid dissemination and implementation of common narratives and naming conventions across various genres of content (for example, the image of 'pigdogs' on the map of hostility, the same ways of naming the enemy in the official media, social networks and films).

It is significant that in Ukrainian media discourse, negative forms of naming the enemy are almost equally prevalent in everyday speech and media texts of various genres—from news reports to films and memes. This unusual phenomenon of language diffusion in the media still requires further study, creating prospects for research on this topic.

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## **СПОСОБИ ПОЗНАЧЕННЯ ВОРОГА В МЕДІАТЕКСТАХ. УКРАЇНСЬКІ ТА ПОЛЬСЬКІ ДОКУМЕНТАЛЬНІ, УКРАЇНСЬКІ ХУДОЖНІ ФІЛЬМИ ТА ЗМІ**

У статті проведено аналіз мовних одиниць на позначення ворога, які використовуються в медіаконтенті різних жанрів: офіційних ЗМІ, документальних, художніх фільмах. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена гострою потребою вивчення особливостей лінгвістичних кінодискурсів у ЗМІ загалом і кіно як особливого виду медіаконтенту. Предметом дослідження є мовні форми найменування ворога в українських документальних і художніх фільмах періоду повномасштабного вторгнення та використання подібних форм у медіатекстах для визначення особливостей співвідношення різних медіажанрів. Дослідниця поставила за мету описати мовні форми, що використовуються для найменування ворога, простежити їх співвідношення в різних жанрах ЗМІ. Для досягнення мети було використано такі методи дослідження: контент-аналіз, порівняльний аналіз, семантичний аналіз, контекстний аналіз.

Результати дослідження доводять, що слова з ознаками мови ворожнечі, які містять у собі намір приниження, неповаги тощо, є особливою мовною стратегією, яка стає провідною для ЗМІ в період збройного протистояння. Подібність у наративах і номінаціях свідчить про формування спільного мовленнєвого дискурсу для різного за своєю природою медіаконтенту. Серед найпоширеніших номінацій можна виокремити такі: «русня», «кацап / кацапня», «рашисти», «москалі», «орки», «нечисть», поняття «русскій мір», «визволителі» в документальних і художніх фільмах та в інформаційних повідомленнях онлайн-медіа.

Подібні номінації є виявом мови ворожнечі, що зазвичай сприймається як небажаний вияв ментальної нетолерантності, однак у часи війни формування цілого пласту таких номінацій постає виявом спротиву, світоглядного протистояння ворогові, психологічним механізмом його дегуманізації на фоні загостреного сприйняття своєї самості перед обличчям загрози.

*Ключові слова:* мова ворожнечі; медіаконтент; документальний; художній фільм.

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